A recent article by Robert Reynolds and Janusz Ordover in the Antitrust Law Journal argues for a nearly opposite view-that in at least one critical instance, the theory of harm advanced by the Commission had sound theoretical and empirical support, while subsequent criticisms of the Commission decision by U.S. policy makers and others "stem from an incomplete understanding of the economic (theoretical and empirical) bases for competitive concerns." 3 This paper examines that claim.
To review briefly, General Electric (GE) is one of three major producers of engines for large commercial aircraft, defined here, as in the Commission decision, as planes with over 100 seats and a range of 2,000 to 8,000 nautical miles. These aircraft, currently produced only by Airbus and Boeing, 4 are purchased primarily by airlines and leasing companies, with the latter making up more than a quarter of all orders of large commercial aircraft in recent years. 5 GE competes with Pratt and Whitney and Rolls-Royce in producing engines for large commercial aircraft. GE is the only one of the three with a large aircraft leasing subsidiary. 6 In late 2000, GE announced plans to merge with another large conglomerate, Honeywell. Honeywell does not make engines for large commercial aircraft, but produces many complementary aircraft systems purchased by Boeing and Airbus and in some cases directly by airlines and other final purchasers. 7 These include various avionics products, such as weather radar and satellite communications equipment, and non-avionics products, such as auxiliary power units (APUs), wheels and brakes, and engine controls. 8 The product lines of GE and Honeywell directly overlap only in a few relatively small markets. After commitments by GE to resolve competitive Effects: It's a Long Way to Go from Chicago to Brussels, Remarks Before the George Mason University Symposium (Nov. 9, 2001 ), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/ speeches/9536.htm.
3 Robert J. Reynolds & Janusz Ordover, Archimedean Leveraging and the GE/Honeywell Transaction, 70 Antitrust L. J. 171, 172-73 (2002) . 4 McDonnell Douglas was also a significant producer of large commercial aircraft until its merger with Boeing in 1997. Lockheed's participation in the large commercial aircraft market ended in 1983, with completion of the production run of its L-1011 jet.
5 See infra Table 1 . "Leasing companies" here refers to speculative leasing companies only. 6 Rolls-Royce owns 50% of a small leasing company, Pembroke, which will be discussed in more detail below. 7 Honeywell does manufacture an engine for a plane that is classified by the Commission as a large regional jet. Horizontal overlap in engines for the large regional jet market was cited by the Commission as among the anticompetitive effects of the merger, but will not be discussed here. 8 The Commission decision defines avionics products as those that "relate to the range of equipment used for the control of the aircraft, for navigation and communication as This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
concerns in the market for military helicopter engines and the market for maintenance, repair, and overhaul services for certain Honeywell engines and APUs, the U.S. Department of Justice approved the merger in mid-2001. 9 Later that summer, however, the European Commission blocked the merger, citing deep concerns about issues beyond strict horizontal overlaps, including anticompetitive bundling of complementary goods and the impact of GE's airplane leasing arm, on various upstream aircraft systems markets.
In their article, Reynolds and Ordover elaborate on this last aspect of the merger, which was central to the Commission's predictions of harm: the alleged anticompetitive impact of GE's aircraft leasing subsidiary, General Capital Aviation Services (GECAS), on aircraft engine and systems markets. 10 Both Reynolds and Ordover, and the European Commission in its final decision, argue that had the merger been approved, GECAS's ability and incentive to shift aircraft preferences of downstream consumers would have stifled competition in the aircraft systems markets in which Honeywell participates, and that these effects could be demonstrated by analyzing the anticompetitive effects that they alleged GECAS had already had on the aircraft engine market. 11 This article evaluates the theory and evidence presented by Reynolds and Ordover and the corresponding arguments made by the European Commission. It concludes that the extensive foreclosure that opponents of the merger predicted would result from the vertical integration of Honeywell with GE's downstream leasing arm would have been a very unlikely outcome. In part, this conclusion follows from an empirical analysis of the claim that GE's leasing operations had already had an anticompetitive effect in the engine market by shifting market share towards GE. The evidence shows that the Reynolds and Ordover analysis of GECAS's past impact is flawed, and that a better estimate yields at most a shift of 1.5 percent of large commercial aircraft engine sales toward GE after GECAS's arrival on the market. This small engine share shift does not translate into past or future anticompetitive effects in any market. The Reynolds and Ordover theoretical model of "Archimedean Leveraging," which does predict such an outcome, rests on flawed assumptions.
II. EFFECT OF GE'S LEASING OPERATIONS ON THE ENGINE MARKET
Reynolds and Ordover offer a model of competition in the aircraft systems market in which GE can use its ownership of a leasing company to shift some aircraft sales towards its favored planes, and the ability to shift even a small number of such purchases is enough to tip the market to GE products, foreclose competition, and generate substantial consumer harm. They claim that if GE acquired Honeywell, GECAS's ability to shift downstream demand toward aircraft containing Honeywell systems would induce airframe makers to select Honeywell systems, and leave its competitors with little choice but to withdraw from the market.
Lacking the ability to test this model directly because the merger was blocked, they look to the past impact of GECAS on the aircraft engine market for evidence on what would have happened in the systems market. 12 They find a GECAS-induced shift of market share towards GE engines after GECAS appeared in the market as a significant speculative lessor in 1996. Both the European Commission (in paragraph 138 of the decision) and Reynolds and Ordover compare a pre-GECAS period of 1988-1995 with a post-GECAS period of 1996-2000, and find a GECASinduced shift towards GE engines. While GECAS's impact on the aircraft engine market was not directly at issue in the merger because it would have been present with or without a merger of GE and Honeywell, it nonetheless provides a critical link in the chain of argument that led to fears of the anticompetitive impact of GECAS post-merger.
Although a shift in engine shares might reflect procompetitive aspects of the vertical relationship between GE and GECAS, Reynolds and Ordover offer no analysis of whether GE's development of an aircraft leasing subsidiary had any actual anticompetitive effects. 13 Moreover, a review of the data largely refutes their claim that GECAS shifted large commercial aircraft engine market share towards GE in a substantial way, though it did have a small effect on a segment of the market. 14 12 In fact, they argue that these anticompetitive effects would have been even stronger in the aircraft systems markets than in the engine market.
13 GECAS was formed after GE's 1993 acquisition of Guinness Peat Aviation, one of the largest aircraft-leasing companies at the time.
14 Data analyzed here include transactions through December 5, 2002. The data do not say anything directly about GECAS's impact on the market for large regional jets, defined by the Commission as planes with 70-90+ seats and a range of 1,500-2,000 nautical miles. Though Reynolds and Ordover include large regional jets with large commercial aircraft This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
A. The Market for Aircraft Engines
Large commercial aircraft engine market share in the pre-and post-GECAS periods is best understood in the context of broader market developments over a longer period of time. The popularity of GE engines (including those produced by its joint venture CFM International) in both periods has been largely defined by events that occurred more than a decade prior to the advent of GECAS.
In the late 1960s and 1970s, as worldwide jet travel began its march toward ubiquity, Pratt & Whitney sold the vast majority of engines for large commercial aircraft. Its JT8D engine, available for the Douglas DC9, Boeing 727, and early versions of the Boeing 737, powered more than half of all large commercial aircraft sold in that period. The popularity of the JT8D, along with the JT3 and JT9D, helped Pratt place its engines on about 80 percent of large commercial aircraft sold. Pratt's singular position in the large commercial aircraft engine market extended into the early 1980s-it captured close to 90 percent of new orders as recently as 1982. 15 The beginning of the end of Pratt & Whitney's leading position arrived with Boeing's 1981 launch of a new version of the 737 with an engine produced jointly by GE and the French engine company Snecma. 16 The in some of their tabulations and analysis, large regional jets have only one engine option, and market share in this market is entirely a function of which engines win placement on new planes. GE has won the engine placement on the most recently developed large regional jets, the Embraer ERJ-170/190, and the Bombardier CRJ-700/900 (it had also won placement on the latest Fairchild-Dornier regional jet before that program was cancelled due to the bankruptcy of Fairchild-Dornier), which have for the most part replaced earlier-generation models by Fokker (with Rolls-Royce engines) and British Aerospace (with Honeywell engines). These engine placements were won after the advent of GECAS in 1996, but the question of what role GECAS had in these victories is not one that these data can answer. The European Commission and Reynolds and Ordover argue that GECAS had a role in these victories, while others have disagreed (see, e.g., Kolasky, supra note 2). The data analyzed here cannot separate the two hypotheses. 15 All data in this section and elsewhere in the paper, unless otherwise noted, were compiled from the Back Associates Fleet Database. 16 The CFM56 engine began life as the M56, developed by Snecma (majority owned by the French government) to power a new generation of smaller airliners. Snecma decided that it needed a partner on the project. According to Robert Garvin, "The French government supported the concept but recognized that Snecma lacked the technical resources and reputation with the airlines to launch the M56 on its own." Though Pratt & Whitney's parent company owned 11% of Snecma at the time, Pratt appeared to be interested in further developing the JT8D for this market. Rolls and Snecma, on the other hand, had a history of difficulties in previous partnerships. In the end, Snecma partnered with GE in the 50-50 joint venture CFM International to produce what became known as the CFM56 engine. Initial discussions envisioned Snecma as the project leader, but GE was later made project leader at the behest of the U.S. Government, which was concerned about possible transfer of advanced technology outside of the United States. Robert V. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
CFM56 replaced the aging JT8D as the sole engine available on that platform. 17 New generations of Boeing 737s, all using the CFM56 engine, were wildly successful in the 1980s and 1990s, with sales of over 4,000 planes, of roughly 13,000 total large commercial aircraft sold in this period. Versions of the CFM56 engine also powered the Airbus alternative to the 737, the A320 series, and early versions of the Airbus A340. All told, the CFM56 engine powered nearly 45 percent of all large commercial aircraft ordered from 1982 through 2002. With GE's rise, Pratt & Whitney's fortunes fell, as its aging generation of engines centered on the JT8D became obsolete and its new generations of engines were commercial disappointments. Figure 1 shows year-to-year large commercial aircraft engine market share from 1980-2002. 18 The introduction of the CFM56 engine in 1981 helped push GE's market share from just over 12% of new engine orders in 1980 to 61 percent of new orders by 1986. GE's market share, after a brief dip in the early 1990s, hovered between 60 and 70 percent each year to the present. 128-32 (1998) . 17 In the early 1980s, Pratt concentrated its research and development efforts on new middle and large-sized engines and scrapped its small-engine development project for the 737. These gambles did not pay off, as the midsize 757 has sold poorly, and Pratt's large-size engine has faced fierce within-platform competition from GE and Rolls. The small 737, on the other hand, has proven hugely popular. See William M. Carley: Reverse Thrust: How Pratt & Whitney Lost Jet-Engine Lead to GE After 30 Years, Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1988, at A-1. 18 Allocation of engine market share here follows that of the European Commission in its final decision on the GE/Honeywell merger, supra note 8. Engines produced by International Aero Engines (IAE), a joint venture between Rolls-Royce and Pratt & Whitney (and others), and the Engine Alliance, a joint venture between GE and Pratt & Whitney, are split evenly between the two main joint venture partners for market share purposes. CFMI engines are treated as 100% GE engines. Other firms with minority interests in one or more engine programs, such as Japanese Aero Engines Corporation and MTU Aero Engines, are ignored for market share purposes. The Commission justifies its treatment of CFMI engines as equivalent to GE engines for market share purposes by arguing that revenues from CFMI engines are likely reinvested in development of future CFMI engines (id. ¶ 82). Even if true, this only begs the question of the proper calculation of market share in this market, and more generally, what market share represents in the first place, and how it relates to the concept of "dominance" in European antitrust laws. One could imagine that market share is important because it provides a rough measure of technical capabilities important to future engine competitions. Alternatively, the Commission deems market share important because it concludes that aftermarket revenues provide an important source of funding for future engine development ("the higher the aftermarket revenues, the more likely a supplier is to remain competitive in the future") (id. ¶ 79). In either case, the sale of an additional CFMI engine means less to GE's future position in the industry than the sale of an additional GE engine, all else equal, and thus the two should not be treated as equivalent for market share purposes. To remain as consistent with the Commission decision and analysis as possible, however, and because it is not This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association. Since the early 1980s, then, GE has captured Pratt's position as the leading producer of commercial aircraft engines, though it has not fully achieved the position Pratt enjoyed in earlier decades, for two reasons. First, the resurgence of Rolls-Royce, which grew from near oblivion in the early 1980s to roughly 20 percent of new engine orders by the latter half of the 1990s, has helped cap GE's market share at a level below that of Pratt in the 1960s and 1970s. Second, GE's most popular engine is the product of a joint venture; even though GE is the dominant partner in that joint venture, it does not control the technology and aftermarket revenues of the CFMI engines to the extent that Pratt did with the JT8D.
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B. Determinants of Market Share in Engines
Aircraft engine market share from year to year is driven primarily by engines' placements on the various models of aircraft. Exclusive positions provide the greatest boost to market share, all else equal, but most modern aircraft make available at least two, and sometimes three, engine brands to the final customer. Market share thus also depends on an engine's availability as an option on non-exclusive platforms.
Given a particular constellation of engines available on different models, engine market share also depends critically on the demand for different types of aircraft over time. GE's success in gaining an exclusive position on the later-generation 737, for example, more than outweighed its failure to place an engine on the 757, as the former aircraft has been about four times as popular as the latter. 19 Finally, engine market share is also determined by head-to-head engine competition on platforms with multiple engine options.
An important factor in the latter two categories of competitiondemand for aircraft and demand for engine brand on a particular model-is what the European Commission calls the force of "commonality." Airlines tend to standardize on a single engine brand on a given aircraft type or, to a lesser extent, across a given "mission profile" (planes that have a similar range and seating capacity) as a way to save money on training and maintenance. Other important factors in head-to-head engine competition are the quality of the engine and the price of the engine and its aftermarket services.
clear what the best alternative treatment of CFMI engine share would be, in this paper CFMI engines are treated as equivalent to GE engines for market share purposes. 19 The GE scuttled its CF6-32 engine development program for the Boeing 757 after Pratt and Rolls won the bulk of early orders on that platform. See Garvin, supra note 16, at 134. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
C. The Alleged Role of GECAS
Reynolds and Ordover add another factor to this list of important competitive factors: the presence or absence of GECAS as a speculative lessor. GE's engine competitors lack a comparable downstream presence, though Rolls-Royce owns 50 percent of Pembroke, a smaller aircraftleasing company. 20 Speculative lessors purchase planes directly from airframers, primarily Airbus and Boeing, before customers for those planes have been found (as opposed to purely financial lessors, which may assist customers in financing of planes that they have already chosen). GECAS began making significant speculative purchases of new aircraft in 1996. It is one of about a half-dozen significant speculative lessors in the large commercial aircraft market, and along with International Lease Finance Corporation (ILFC), one of the two largest. In its capacity as a speculative lessor, GECAS only purchases planes with GE or CFMI engines, when those engines are available on a particular model. 21 Table 1 shows GECAS and non-GECAS speculative leasing orders, and other large commercial aircraft purchases for the 1988-2002 period. Speculative lessors purchased roughly 22 percent of all planes in the 1988-2002 period. This share has generally increased over the period, though it decreased sharply in 2002 with the collapse of airplane orders in the wake of war and recession.
Reynolds and Ordover hypothesize that the introduction of GECAS as a significant speculative lessor increased final demand for GE engines apart from any change in any of the other factors listed above. This hypothesis can be tested with data on airplane and engine purchases in the pre-and post-GECAS periods.
D. Simple Tests of GECAS's Impact on the Engine Market
The ideal test of the hypothesis that the appearance of GECAS as a speculative lessor has had a significant impact on engine market share (setting aside how to interpret any such effect) would check for a shift in GE engine market share after the appearance of GECAS as a speculative lessor, controlling for other important factors: aircraft models avail- This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
able, the force of commonality, engine foremarket and aftermarket prices, and perceived engine quality over time. While data on the first two of these factors are available in a database compiled by Back Associates, detailed data on pricing or perceived engine quality are not available to researchers, and so this ideal test cannot be implemented.
Reynolds and Ordover present an alternative test that requires less data. They compare two subsets of aircraft orders that they assume are comparable except in that one is subject to the GECAS effect and the other is not. In their Tables 2 and 3 they show engine market share on "competitive-engine aircraft" in the pre-and post-GECAS periods for two subsets of orders-those made by scheduled airlines and those made by speculative leasing companies. 22 These two categories cover roughly 92 percent of orders during that period. 23 If one believes that other important competitive factors-prices, commonality, etc.-operate in the same way over time on each subset of the data, then one can attribute any difference in the change in market share over the pre-and post-GECAS periods to the influence of GECAS on final engine demand.
This assumption is problematic because in fact these two subsets of the data cover different sets of planes. Speculative leasing companies generally serve smaller airlines, both scheduled and non-scheduled, and thus tend to focus relatively more on narrow-body planes than widebodies compared to scheduled airlines as a whole. From 1988-2000, narrow-bodies made up about 81 percent of speculative leasing company orders compared to 68 percent of scheduled airline orders. 24 Let us note but put aside this difficulty for now. Reynolds and Ordover find that GE's engine share in their control group, scheduled airlines, fell from roughly 50 percent to roughly 45 percent, while GE's market share in its treatment group, leasing companies, rose from slightly over 40 percent to slightly over 60 percent. This seems to be a large effect; Reynolds and Ordover note "an overall shift of 27 percentage points in GE's share of engine-competitive aircraft ordered by leasing companies" relative to scheduled airlines due to GECAS. 25 A second problem with this analysis is that the customer composition of the two groups is not fixed over time-airlines continually make/buy vs. lease decisions with respect to new plane orders and thus airlines' orders can shift over time back and forth between the scheduled airlines and speculative leasing categories. This fact can easily invalidate the test that Reynolds and Ordover construct. Specifically, if GECAS managed to sway some airlines from buying to leasing planes, then the effect that Reynolds and Ordover identify may be entirely spurious. A shift of GEengined planes to the leasing market would simultaneously decrease the GE engine share among scheduled airlines and increase its share among leasing companies, even if final consumer demand for planes with GE engines has not changed. The 27 percent figure is completely consistent with no change in final engine demand at all. Barry Nalebuff and David Majerus make this point, and go on to show that in fact a comparison of pre-to post-GECAS leasing share points to this interpretation. 26 The data in Table 1 show that indeed the appearance of GECAS coincided with a large expansion of speculative leasing orders relative to scheduled airline orders. Among the categories of engine competitive aircraft analyzed by Reynolds and Ordover, speculative leasing companies' share of orders grew relative to scheduled airlines from 17 percent of the total of the two pre-GECAS (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) to 32 percent in their post-GECAS (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) period. GECAS accounts for a large part of this expansion. This fact brings into question the validity of the Reynolds and Ordover approach.
A naïve test, simply pooling all of the data and comparing engine market share pre-and post-GECAS, solves the group-composition problem but introduces many others. It does not control for all of the other factors changing over time-aircraft available, fore-and aftermarket prices, perceived quality, changing customer mix, etc.
Controlling for the aircraft available by confining attention to a single model in the pre-and post-GECAS periods, can give a better idea of GECAS's influence on market share, at least on that model. Although this test is not perfect, it does correct a flaw in the Reynolds/Ordover test. 27 GECAS's purchases of engine-competitive large commercial aircraft are heavily concentrated on a few models. From 1996-2002, the A320 series and 737 accounted for 82 percent of GECAS net orders, making 26 Barry Nalebuff & David Majerus, Bundling, Tying and Portfolio Effects, Part 2: Case Studies 56-59 (DTI Economics Paper #1, Feb. 2003) . 27 This test assumes that pricing and perceived quality have remained constant on engines on that model, and that the underlying preferences of the customers are roughly the same in the aggregate in the pre-and post-GECAS periods. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
these planes the most likely to exhibit any purported GECAS effect. 28 In each case, GECAS's orders make up a significant portion of total orders (between 8 and 9 percent). Table 2 shows that engine share on the A320 is virtually indistinguishable pre-and post-GECAS, despite the relatively large number of GECAS orders. 29 The closest competitor of Airbus's A320 series is the Boeing 737, which made up an even larger share of GECAS orders. Because this platform has only one engine option, the CFM56, it makes no sense to track Table 2 . Airbus A320 Series Engine Market Shares, Pre-and Post-GECAS Pre-GECAS (1988 -1995 Post- GECAS (1996 GECAS ( -2002 Another place to look may be the 767. Although GECAS purchased few 767s, GECAS accounted for a larger share (10.1%) of industry 767 purchases than it did for any other model. The 767, however, turns out to be a good illustration of the problems that can arise in any simple "pre-GECAS" vs. "post-GECAS" tabulation. The data show a significant shift in engine share from the pre-to the post-GECAS period that might be attributed to the presence of GECAS, if it were assumed that all other relevant factors (e.g., prices, airline preferences) are constant across the two periods. A year-to-year breakdown of engine sales for the 767 reveals that during the period 1988-1990, sales of Pratt engines roughly equal those of GE engines. In 1991 the Pratt share drops off significantly, and it never recovers. The real driver of the pre-and post-GECAS differences in market share appears to be a May 1991 Lauda Air crash involving a Boeing 767 with Pratt & Whitney engines that killed all aboard. A thrust reverser accidentally deployed during flight on the Lauda Air 767 that crashed. Citing fears about the thrust reversers on the plane's engines, the FAA issued an order to airlines to disconnect thrust reversers on 767 engines with Pratt & Whitney engines (a thrust reverser is used to reverse engine flow to help slow a plane during landing, but a plane can still land with a disconnected thrust reverser by relying on regular braking). See FAA Ban on Thrust Reversers Revoked for Most Boeing 767s, Wash. Post, Aug. 25, 1991, at A8. Pratt's PW4000 engine and the Boeing 767 were both relatively new at the time and thus early concerns about the safety of the Pratt engine on this platform may have had a much greater impact than they would have had on a more established model. 29 Orders with engine "to be determined" are excluded from this calculation. This likely biases the post-GECAS results toward GE engines to some extent because orders with engines "to be determined" are primarily made by non-GECAS leasing companies (because GECAS always orders GE engines, its orders never fall into this category), and these orders are weighted more towards non-GE engines than those of the group as a whole. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association. Table 3 . GE Engine Share in Boeing B737 and Airbus A320, Pre-and Post-GECAS Pre-GECAS (1988 -1995 Post- GECAS (1996 GECAS ( -2002 engine share over time on this model. However, we may believe that GECAS influenced market share by shifting some customers of the competitive engine A320 to the GE-only 737. 30 Thus, it may be worthwhile to track GE engine share over time within this larger group. Table 3 shows GE's engine share across the pre-and post-GECAS periods within the A320 series and the 737 combined. The combined GE share actually declined slightly over the two periods, from 84 percent to 80 percent. The relative popularity of the A320 series increased across the two periods, and it is possible that this decline in GE's engine share would have been more severe had it not been for the presence of GECAS. Although these tabulations do not refute a hypothesis that GECAS helped stem the tide of a decline in GE's engine market share, neither Reynolds and Ordover nor the European Commission make this claim. Rather, they argue that GECAS has been instrumental in furthering GE's engine dominance.
The data described above indicate that GECAS has not tipped the large commercial aircraft market in any substantial way towards GE/ CFMI engines, either overall or within the particular narrow-body planes in which GECAS specializes. Simple tabulations, however, do not control for other factors that affect market share and, therefore, cannot unambiguously show whether GECAS has had any effect on the market.
E. Econometric Analysis of GECAS's Impact on the Engine Market
A test of the GECAS effect ideally would control for customer composition, model composition, and price when comparing sales in the pre-30 GECAS's ratio of A320 to 737 orders is lower than that for the industry as a whole. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
GECAS to the post-GECAS period. Price information is not available, so the data cannot separate the hypothesis of GECAS's influence from the hypothesis that GE's engine pricing policies changed from the pre-to post-GECAS period relative to its competitors. 31 The Appendix presents two models of the determination of engine market share: first, a series of simple OLS regressions of market share over time on explanatory variables including the presence or absence of GECAS from the market. This is done both for the market as a whole and for subgroups including engine competitive models only, the 737 and A320 only, and the A320 only. None of the regressions detects a significant GECAS-related impact on the market.
This formulation might fail to detect a GECAS effect if such an effect is obscured by the noise of purchases on which no one would expect GECAS to have influence. GECAS's customers are primarily smaller scheduled and non-scheduled airlines. In the vast majority of cases, airlines standardize on a single engine brand on a particular model. No one argues that GECAS has swayed the purchases of the largest airlines, or on engine choices on platforms for which the engine brand had been locked in before 1996. Thus, another approach is to examine whether airlines making their first engine choice (on a particular enginecompetitive airline platform) were more likely to choose GE engines in the post-GECAS period than in the pre-GECAS period, all else equal. This question can be addressed by a logit model of initial engine choice as function of the type of aircraft, past engine choices on other aircraft, the size of the airline (as measured by installed base of engines), and the post-1995 presence of GECAS.
Estimation of the logit model finds a small, statistically significant GECAS impact on small airlines' first engine choices. For this purpose, a small airline is defined as an airline with an installed base of less than 50 engines, a medium airline as an airline with an installed base of 50-99 engines, and a large airline one with an installed base of 100 or more engines. 32 Small airlines were roughly 19 percent more likely to choose 31 The "GECAS effect" and price are not necessarily separate issues. For instance, the appearance of GECAS could lead to discounted engine prices either for efficiency or predatory reasons. Alternatively, GECAS's market power in some market might be used to push GE engines rather than extract profits directly. In general, if there is a GECAS effect, it is important to understand how this effect operates. These questions will be discussed in more detail infra in Part III. a GE engine for their first engine choice on a platform in the post-GECAS period compared to the pre-GECAS period. 33 Details of the estimation are given in the Appendix.
The magnitude of this effect is smaller than Reynolds's and Ordover's estimates of the impact of GECAS. Assuming that these initial purchases defined all subsequent purchases on a given airline/platform combination, and summing across the post-GECAS period of 1996-2002, yields a total of 175 engines switching to GE in the post-GECAS period. This comprises a little less than 1.5 percent of the total of 13,248 large commercial aircraft engines sold during this period.
III. SOURCE OF GECAS's IMPACT?
Even if the appearance of GECAS coincided with a small turn towards GE engines in a certain segment of the market, this fact does not tell us anything about the transmission mechanism of this "GECAS effect." Reynolds and Ordover (and the European Commission, for that matter) are notably silent on this issue. They set about to prove the existence and implications of GECAS's downstream share-shifting power but do not discuss the source of GECAS's share shifting. Yet, this transmission mechanism is critical in evaluating whether or not GE's control of GECAS yields any market outcome that could be deemed anticompetitive.
In the present instance, the small size of GECAS's influence on the market for large commercial aircraft engines, as estimated above, probably precludes finding any serious anticompetitive harm in that market regardless of the transmission mechanism. It is nonetheless worth considering how the existence of GECAS might lead to extra GE engine sales, since this can tell us something about how GECAS might affect other component markets, such as those served by Honeywell.
There are three plausible ways that GE's ownership of GECAS might affect GE's component sales. First, as the European Commission was concerned, GE might engage in anticompetitive vertical foreclosure. Economic models of vertical foreclosure usually rely, however, on some form of downstream market power to generate a potential anticompetitive effect. 34 A second possibility is that GE uses GECAS to offer indirect and Qatar Airlines. Roughly 66% of the observations used in the logit models represent small airlines, 11% medium, and 22% large. 33 There is a nineteen-percentage-point difference between the likelihood of GE selection for small airlines in the post-GECAS period compared to the pre-GECAS period (53% compared to 34%) evaluated at the means of the data. discounts to airlines that choose GE engines. Normally, such discounting would be considered a manifestation of healthy competition, but if the discounting were predatory in some sense it could be cause for concern. Finally, the combination of GE and GECAS could produce synergies that reduce total effective costs when GECAS offers leasing packages with GE engines, giving GE a cost advantage relative to independent competitors. This section evaluates the three possibilities in turn.
A. GECAS and Market Power
GECAS purchases only about 10 percent of new large commercial and large regional aircraft. This does not necessarily preclude it from having market power in some market. Market share is an oft-used proxy for market power, but the two are not equivalent, and in any case the 10 percent figure does not correspond to any relevant market defined by the Commission. 35 Market definition analysis traditionally considers the availability of demand-side substitutes from both a product perspective and a geographic perspective. The latter does not apply in this case as all sides consider this to be a worldwide market. On the product side, speculative leasing companies, such as GECAS, provide airlines with aircraft that are immediately available and are offered with relatively short-term (up to 8-9 year) operating leases. These provisions transfer risk from the airline to the leasing company. Airlines, however, also have the option to buy planes directly from the manufacturer, which involves a longer lead time but allows them more flexibility in choosing options. They can also engage in transactions that combine elements of both-such as financial leases or sale-leaseback deals. 36 A broad range of financial services companies provides purely financial leases and sale-leaseback transactions, including hundreds of large Amer- Rev. 267 (1983) . Although the present case is perhaps not a typical vertical foreclosure story, in that the upstream and downstream levels are not adjacent, GECAS's market power might be a straightforward way to explain GECAS's share-shifting. Of course, without there being more to the story, even if it had downstream market power it is not obvious why GE would choose to use its market power to push GE engines rather than to extract profits downstream. 35 For one thing, it encompasses both large regional and large commercial aircraft, two distinct markets in the Commission's rendering. 36 Financial leases are generally longer term than operating leases, and the airline assumes more risk in these deals than with operating leases provided by speculative lessors. Sale-leaseback transactions transfer ownership of the aircraft to an outside company for balance sheet reasons, but allow the airline to operate the same aircraft under lease from the new owner. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
ican, European, and Japanese banks and financial institutions. A much smaller set of companies operate as speculative lessors-buying planes directly from manufacturers before customers have been identified, and then searching for customers for those planes by offering relatively shortterm operating leases while retaining ownership of the asset. International Lease Finance Corporation (ILFC) and GECAS are the largest speculative lessors, but there are about ten smaller firms also active in the market.
Any evaluation of the question of whether GECAS has market power in some market must consider the ability of airlines to substitute financial leases and their own purchasing for leasing from speculative leasing companies. Certainly if an airline needs an airplane on short notice for a limited period of time, leasing from a speculative lessor is an attractive option. Still, applying the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines hypothetical monopolist test, 37 one would have to consider whether a hypothetical monopolist of speculative leasing services would be substantially constrained in raising prices by competition from direct purchases or financial lessors. This is an exercise that neither the European Commission nor Reynolds and Ordover have engaged in.
Let us assume for the moment that speculative leasing does function as a separate market in an antitrust sense. Can GECAS be said to have market power in this market? GECAS has a 25 percent share of the "speculative leasing market" when measured by new plane purchases from 1996-2002. This would not normally lead to any legal presumption of substantial market power in either the United States or the European Union. Antitrust agencies and courts traditionally require both a high market share in a well-defined market and significant barriers to entry, and neither has been established here. Market power often derives from control of some relatively scarce resource or at least somewhat captive audience. 38 In GECAS's case, it is difficult to see what this resource would be. An examination of GECAS's top customers shows that the vast majority also purchase planes directly, and most lease planes from more than one speculative lessor, as shown in Table 4 [Vol. 72 Antitrust Law Journal 252 that the theory of harm they outline does not rely on GECAS's market power in the traditional sense. 39 As a result, they have not analyzed the ability of airlines and reject GE's attempts to impose its component choices on the market. 40 
B. Predatory Discounting
If GECAS does not have market power in the traditional sense, then we need to look elsewhere for the source of any ability to shift downstream demand. The Commission decision evinces broad concern about the financial strength of GE and its ability to discount its engines in a way designed to disadvantage less-well-financed competitors. For instance, the Commission offers a theory in which GE discounts its engine prices but raises prices on aftermarket parts and services. According to this theory, the revenue stream for engine manufacturers is shifted further into the future, weakening competitors that are less able to defer revenue than GE, while at the same time not necessarily lowering and perhaps even raising the net price to consumers. 41 While it never alleges predation in the classic sense of price below some measure of variable unit cost, concerns about GE's financial strength are evident throughout the decision. 42 The Reynolds and Ordover model assumes the existence of GECAS's share-shifting abilities but is agnostic about the source of those abilities. In contrast to the Commission's decision, Reynolds and Ordover do not rely on GE's deep pockets; their proposed mechanism of GECAS's 39 The GE/Honeywell decision, supra note 8, ¶ ¶ 125-126, states: "While it is true that GECAS accounts for only about 10% of aircraft purchases, and that "share" figure is smaller than is usually associated with traditional notions of market power. . . .the results of the Commission's investigation confirmed that, because of both GECAS's demonstrated purchasing bias and its ability to place huge aircraft orders, it's 10% share of aircraft purchases significantly under-represents its influence over the aircraft engines and systems selection process." Reynolds & Ordover, supra note 3, at 192 write: "The major misconception about the GECAS share of commercial aircraft purchases is that such a share cannot be associated with competitive harm. Economists have long recognized that there is no magic to market shares. For example, a given share may be associated with significant market power in some circumstances but not in others . . . what matters, in the assessment of either horizontal or vertical transactions, is the theoretical and empirical analysis of the likely competitive effects of the transaction. anticompetitive influence would work the same way if Pratt, or Honeywell for that matter, owned GECAS.
If one posits that GECAS's share-shifting abilities derive from some form of strategic discounting by GE-that is, sacrificing leasing or engine profits in order to change customers' choices of components or airplanes to induce the exit of competitors-then this begs the questions: under what circumstances such a strategy be considered "anticompetitive," and how does GECAS facilitate such a strategy?
Data on engine pricing are not readily available, and the Commission does not allege below-cost pricing by GE. Although above-cost discounting can be predatory and is not necessarily immune from antitrust scrutiny simply by the fact of being above a measure of variable cost, any discounting will tend to harm all competitors and perhaps threaten the existence of the less-efficient ones. 43 Competitors' calls for a softening of price competition should be treated with the appropriate level of skepticism.
More importantly, though, from the standpoint whether GECAS itself is anticompetitive, is the issue of whether the presence of GECAS enables any predatory strategies. Consider the engine example. GE and its engine competitors can always influence engine demand, and even final plane demand, through their engine prices. It terms of a pure discounting strategy, it is difficult to see how a discount on leasing rates in connection with engine choice is not simply equivalent to some engine discount. One might think that the issue is whether GECAS allows some contact with the final customer that its competitors do not have. Neither Reynolds and Ordover nor the Commission directly makes this argument. Certainly, on the engine side, Pratt and Rolls are perfectly capable of broadly negotiating with airlines directly to change their engine or leasing choices. 44 It might be more difficult for smaller components manufactur- 43 Pricing does not have to be below incremental cost for a strategy to be predatory in an economic sense. For a recent discussion, see Aaron S. 's v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) , indicates that some courts may be taking a broader view of predatory behavior as well. Still, the logic of the Commission's decision would seem to imply that the firm with the deepest pockets in virtually any industry in which ongoing investment is important could choose to become a monopolist. This does not seem to be the case historically. For what it is worth, GE's financial statements show both aircraft engines and GECAS segments as consistently profitable in recent years. ers to do so, but this would not seem to be a problem for United Technologies-the owner of Pratt & Whitney-which would have been GE/Honeywell's competitor both on the engine side and in many components markets. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Part IV below.
C. Efficiencies
The integration of GECAS with GE engines could generate either supply-side or demand-side economies of scope. GE's knowledge of engines and engine services might allow GECAS to structure superior leasing deals, or, in the other direction, GECAS's contact with airlines on the leasing side might provide valuable information for GE in developing engine and engine service programs. On the demand side, customers might receive "one-stop shopping" benefits from obtaining multiple services from a single supplier. Any of these benefits could lead to effective price reductions for the GE/GECAS combination of services relative to competitors, which would tend to shift some market share toward GE engines. This could explain the effect we pick up in the data above.
Reynolds and Ordover acknowledge the possibility of efficiencies between GECAS and GE, but they view this as a negative factor, expressing their concern that significant scope economies between GECAS and other parts of GE would hamper the ability of competitors to counter GECAS's effects. 45 If efficiencies are the driving force behind any share shifting to GE engines, it is unlikely to have had net anticompetitive effects. Indeed, efficiencies are generally considered reasons to approve a merger. On the other hand, European Commission merger decisions have sometimes attacked merger-related synergies as contributing to the anticompetitive creation or enhancement of dominance. 46 Although one could construct a theoretical world in which mergerrelated efficiencies would ultimately harm consumers in the long run, any policy condemning efficiencies treads on very dangerous ground, and is likely to do more harm than good. The short-term effect of synergies is to effectively lower the combined price of engines and leasing services to final consumers. Taking a broader perspective, healthy competition is defined by firms trying to gain advantage over their competitors repair, and overhaul facility co-owned by Air New Zealand and Pratt. See ANZ Abandons GECAS A320 Lease After IAE Engine Choice, Flight Int'l, Dec. 17, 2002, at 9. 45 Reynolds & Ordover, supra note 3, n.52. The Commission decision is silent on the issue of efficiencies between GECAS and other parts of GE's operation driving any past share shifting toward GE/GECAS. 46 This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
(and thus profits) in part by developing new, or new combinations of, inputs and outputs. Penalizing firms that are successful in developing a superior product because they realize a temporary advantage over a competitor throws up a harmful roadblock in this evolutionary process.
In any case, in this instance the effect of GECAS on engine market share has been shown to be small, and is dwarfed by other aspects of competition. Regardless of the theoretical possibility of harm from efficiencies, then, it is difficult to envision an efficient GE/GECAS combination tipping the market so decisively as to harm consumers in the long run, at least in the engine market.
IV. THE IMPACT OF GECAS ON OTHER MARKETS
Estimating GECAS's share-shifting power in the engine market is only the first step in Reynolds' and Ordover's analysis. It is used to confirm the existence of a "GECAS effect," which appears in their model of airframers' decision making as an exogenous GECAS ability to shift downstream airline demand toward favored airplanes. The model predicts anticompetitive effects in the components markets that GE would have entered after the acquisition of Honeywell.
Their logic is as follows: airframers, such as Boeing and Airbus, do not have strong preferences as to which components they use in their planes, deriving in part from the fact that customers are indifferent to component choice. 47 GECAS gives GE the ability to costlessly shift downstream demand toward its favored planes. 48 Post-merger, GE would define GECAS-favored planes as those with Honeywell components. Knowing that installing Honeywell components would produce additional GECAS-inspired sales, and given that they do not have strong preferences for non-Honeywell components, airframers would standardize on Honeywell components where available, either to gain a sales advantage over their competitors or to prevent a sales disadvantage. Component manufacturers could not effectively respond with price cuts because any reasonable component-specific price cut would be worth much less to airframers than additional sales of even a few airplanes. Honeywell competitors would become marginalized or exit, and the 47 The Reynolds and Ordover pivotal leveraging model concerns components that are chosen by the manufacturer and not the buyer, so called "SFE" (seller furnished equipment) systems. 48 Reynolds and Ordover do note that in general such share shifting may be costly (seecombined GE/Honeywell would end up dominating those components markets. 49 There are a number of problems with this model of the industry. While there is some evidence, presented above, that the appearance of GECAS has coincided with a small shift toward GE engines on enginecompetitive aircraft in a certain segment of the market, no one has presented any evidence that GECAS has affected any airline's plane choice, which is the mechanism that drives the above result. If GECAS cannot affect an airline's choice of aircraft, its insistence on Honeywell components either lacks credibility or has no effect; GECAS would simply lose sales of non-Honeywell-equipped planes to other lessors or to airlines' own purchases. In fact, an airline's choice of planes is likely to be much less flexible than its choice of engines or other components. If GECAS had a strong influence over plane choice in the narrow-body markets in which it is active, one might think that its appearance as a major speculative lessor would have coincided with a shift in the market from the engine-competitive A320 series to the GE-only 737. The trend, however, has been in the opposite direction. Table 3 shows that the 737 made up 65 percent of all 737/A320 orders in the 1988-1995 pre-GECAS period but only 55 percent in the 1996-2002 post-GECAS period.
The Reynolds-Ordover model is also internally inconsistent. It minimizes the issue of product differentiation by essentially assuming that there is no cost to Boeing and Airbus in switching from their preferred systems to Honeywell's offerings. 50 In reality, airframers have a preferred constellation of components for any given plane that in any given case likely involves a mix of Honeywell and competing systems. Switching from this preferred constellation of products to a Honeywell-only slate of products involves a cost-either directly in terms of higher prices, or indirectly in terms of customer satisfaction, or both. While it may be true, as both the European Commission and Reynolds and Ordover assert, that customers do not have any independent preferences for 49 The European Commission shares the view that competition in these SFE aircraft systems markets would eventually collapse post-merger into GE/Honeywell dominance, with any remaining competitors marginalized, though they are less specific about the exact mechanism. See GE/Honeywell, supra note 8, ¶ ¶ 342-348. 50 Reynolds and Ordover do not assert that airframers are completely indifferent between SFE systems, but that they do not have "strong preferences" for non-Honeywell systems and would lose "very little" from non-GECAS customers from choosing Honeywell equipment over their preferred equipment. Reynolds & Ordover, supra note 3, at 181. As a practical matter, though, they ignore this effect in their analysis. Even if the "very little" loss of customers that results from choosing Honeywell systems rather than the airframer's preferred systems equaled only three or four planes, it would more than balance the "few additional aircraft orders" that they assert is all that GECAS needs to provide to tip the market irrevocably toward Honeywell components. Id. at 180-81. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
seller-furnished systems brands, one would not expect them to because they do not choose the components themselves. They likely attribute their performance to the airframe manufacturer directly. As long as seller-furnished components are somewhat differentiated, their placement will matter to the final consumer, and the airframer will reduce its demand by choosing less-preferred components. Looking at it another way, If SFE systems were really as undifferentiated as Reynolds and Ordover and the European Commission assume, it is difficult to see how these systems manufacturers could sustain the margins necessary to continue to invest in the market via research and development or otherwise, regardless of any merger. 51 Product differentiation works against the model on another dimension as well. In the case of the large commercial aircraft industry, with only two airframers, once one airframer has standardized on Honeywell systems, the other airframer will have an additional incentive to choose non-Honeywell products: choosing Honeywell's SFE systems will move the airframer closer to its competitor in product space, and the resulting lower level of differentiation will mean more intense competition and lower profits. In addition, the second airframer in this formulation would of course consider the fact that choosing Honeywell systems could lead to future exit and marginalization of Honeywell competitors. The possibility that it would end up subject to monopoly supply on important systems is a cost that the airframer would consider in its systems choice, and is another factor pushing the airframer away from Honeywell systems relative to its choices pre-merger.
In the end, the Reynolds and Ordover model of the aircraft equipment market is inherently unstable. It would predict a collapse to a single supplier through any number of avenues, with or without a merger of GE and Honeywell. If Honeywell's systems markets are truly undifferentiated, even without any merger its competitors would find that "their relatively small shares, the substantial R&D investment required for new systems, and the relatively infrequent new airframe platforms, would make bidding for new contracts uneconomical," the result that Reynolds and Ordover predict will follow in the wake of the merger. 52 In fact, Honeywell's major competitors continue to invest in R&D, and their stock prices in the wake of the merger announcement did not seem to reflect any perception on the part of investors that they were any more likely to lose profits or exit the market. In addition, any power GECAS has to 51 I credit Marius Schwartz and Daniel Vincent for this insight in various discussions about GECAS. 52 Reynolds & Ordover, supra note 3, at 191. costlessly shift downstream aircraft demand should be more than matched by ILFC, a larger lessor that has been involved in the speculative leasing market much longer than GECAS. In this model of the world, ILFC essentially holds the survival of a number of systems companies in its hands; if it ever chose to exercise its ability to influence downstream demand, and could figure out a way in which it could be compensated by the beneficiaries, it could bring about a similar collapse to a single supplier.
Finally, in assessing possible strategic responses of competitors to the combination of GECAS and Honeywell, for instance by teaming with each other or counter-merger, Reynolds and Ordover dismiss the possibility by noting that Pratt & Whitney and Rolls-Royce have lost engine sales as a result of GECAS, and "the fact that they have not been able to counter the GECAS strategy in the six years since GE embarked on this new policy is empirical evidence that such counterstrategies are not readily available." 53 In fact, given the size of the GECAS effect (roughly 1.5 percent of large commercial aircraft engines at most), it may indeed not be economical for engine manufacturers to merge with speculative lessors. Money spent on engine R&D or marketing, for instance, may bring about a greater return to market share than investment in a speculative leasing arm. If a wide swath of the industry were faced with marginalization or extinction as a result of GECAS, however, one would expect that the possibility if teaming or counter-merger arrangements would be much more attractive. It is true that such arrangements would not be immediate, but then most of the deleterious effects of the merger cited by the European Commission are not immediate either.
A reasonable model of vertical foreclosure (even non-adjacent vertical foreclosure) must present some tradeoff for the integrated firm-it sacrifices something in the downstream in order to push its upstream good for some ultimate benefit. Analyzing whether foreclosure is a profitable strategy then involves comparing the size of the sacrifice to the size of the ultimate benefit to the integrated firm. In the view of Reynolds and Ordover and the European Commission, however, a post-merger GECAS seemingly sacrifices nothing by pushing GE/Honeywell products, and in return receives the ultimate prize-marginalization or exit of its competitors. 54 It is hard to argue with the conclusion that under these assumptions the merged firm would have the ability and incentive to foreclose its competitors; the key question is whether these assumptions are correct.
53 Id. at 193. 54 They do acknowledge this cost generally, id. n.21, but in their analysis of GECAS never try to estimate a cost to GECAS of shifting share. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
As the above analysis shows, Reynolds and Ordover ignore some key dynamics of the market that work against the conclusion of market foreclosure.
V. CONCLUSION
GE's development of a speculative leasing arm, GECAS, may give it some advantages in selling its engines. The effect is not as large as the one Reynolds and Ordover calculate, and is estimated here to translate to roughly 1.5 percentage points of engine share over a six-year period. This fact alone tells us little about possible anticompetitive concerns, and is likely a manifestation of a healthy competitive process. Successful investments usually yield consumer benefits as well as increased firm profits and/or market share.
GECAS might be of concern in the engine market if this 1.5 percent shift in engine share left competitors little choice but to withdraw. But, of course, there are many ways, such as improved quality and reliability, for engine competitors to recover that 1.5 percent market share. 55 The small ripple in engine market share potentially caused by GECAS is easily outweighed by the outcomes of decisions on research, marketing, and engine development in which engine companies engage repeatedly over time; GE is not always on the winning end of these decisions. 56 Moreover, whatever small effect GECAS has had in the engine market, there is no empirical evidence that GECAS can steer airlines to select different planes. Such steering is the linchpin of the Reynolds and Ordover story, as well as that of the European Commission in condemning Honeywell's acquisition. The model that predicts a collapse toward Honeywell systems post-merger, with the marginalization or exit of Honeywell competitors, ignores key factors that work in the opposite direction.
Defenders of the European Commission's decision to block the GE/ Honeywell merger may respond that the effect of GECAS cannot be 55 Pratt & Whitney's recent problems with its PW6000 engine for the A318 have cost it an early lead over the competing GE engine on that platform. According to one source, "delays resulting from unacceptable fuel-burn levels" on the Pratt PW6000 have pushed orders to the CFM-56 engines. See Trial Period: Engine Manufacturers Are Trying to Weather the Continuing Downturn, While Also Preparing for the Big Competition Ahead, Airline Bus., Mar. 1, 2003, at 50 . Possible problems with the thrust reversers for its Boeing 767 engine cost it market share on that platform. See discussion supra note 28. Pratt & Whitney's decision to concentrate investment in new engines on the Boeing 757 rather than the 737 translated into huge sales losses throughout the last two decades.
56 Rolls-Royce's choice, for example, to develop an engine on its own for the new Airbus A380 super-jumbo may well turn out to be a wiser move than GE's decision to develop an engine jointly with Pratt & Whitney, depending on the ultimate success of that platform. separated from other harmful effects of the merger, which in the view of the Commission derive from GE's overall financial strength and its post-merger ability to bundle complementary products. In this view, it is the combination of these factors that drives competitive harm rather than any one factor alone. Evaluating that argument is beyond the scope of this paper. The GECAS-centric theory of harm articulated by Reynolds and Ordover, however, does not turn on GE's financial strength or its ability to bundle products. The Commission has not specified exactly what is important about the interaction of these effects, aside from the fact that they all allegedly would be advantages enjoyed by post-merger GE/Honeywell over its competitors, to a greater or lesser extent.
The Reynolds and Ordover "Archimedian Leveraging" theory is laudably specific about the mechanism by which GECAS is alleged to cause foreclosure in aircraft systems markets. Such detail facilitates debate on the particulars of the theory and empirical evidence behind it. In the end, however, a careful examination of the theory and facts brings their conclusion into serious doubt. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association. Table 5 shows the results of a number of OLS regressions of GE's share of the aircraft engine market in a given year on a series of explanatory variables including measures of customers' share of GE engines in their existing aircraft, the percentage of wide-body planes purchased in that year, 57 dummies representing model availability, a time trend, and a dummy representing the GECAS period. The regressions generally take the form of
APPENDIX: DETAILED STATISTICAL RESULTS
In these regressions, GEShare t represents the share of GE engines sold in year t across all models. GE's share of installed base of past engine purchases is calculated in two ways: first (GEIBT% t ), as the percentage of GE engines in customers' inventories, weighted by the number of engines each customer purchased in that year; 58 second (GEIBC% t ), for regressions that examine only a subset of aircraft models, as the GE engine percentage of inventories of those models, again weighted by the number of engines each customer purchased in that year. 59 In each case, the purchase weights are calculated only for purchases in the relevant category.
The wide-body percentage variable (wide t ) represents the percentage of planes sold in a given year that were wide bodies. It is meant to capture the fact that GE engines are more popular in narrow bodies than in 57 Wide-body models purchased from 1988-2002 are the Airbus A300, A310, A330, A380, Boeing 747, 767, and 777, and the Douglas DC10. Narrow bodies include the Airbus A320 series, the Boeing 737 and 757, and the Douglas DC9.
58 Airlines with no active inventory of aircraft are not included in this calculation. 59 To illustrate, suppose two airlines purchased planes in a given year: Airline A purchased 10 A320 and 10 B747, and Airline B purchased 5 737 and 5 B767. Assume the former had an installed base of 50% GE engines overall, the latter 100% GE overall. Then the GE installed base percentage variable for that year would be 66.7% (because the former airline is weighted twice as heavily as the latter). In the regressions that examine only A320s, the weighted installed base for all models would be 50% (because only airline A purchased A320s), and the weighted installed base for category models would equal A's GE share in its existing A320s. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
wide bodies; GE therefore would be expected to have a lower market share in years in which wide-body planes are more popular. Including this variable implicitly assumes that, while GECAS may influence engine choice on an engine competitive model, or even possibly model choice within a group of close substitutes, it has no influence on airlines' preferences for wide-body versus narrow-body planes.
The presence of GECAS is represented by a dummy variable (GECAS t ) for years after 1995. In some regressions, a time trend is also included to control for non-GECAS-related trends in market share over time, perhaps related to such factors as brand reputation or foremarket or aftermarket pricing trends.
Though most aircraft models were available throughout the 1988-2002 period, some prominent models appeared and disappeared over the course of those fifteen years. Because the set of aircraft available for purchase has an obvious impact on engine market share, dummy variables (represented above by the vector avail t ) are included to mark significant additions to or departures from the set of aircraft available. 60 The first two regressions in Table 5 include all large commercial aircraft, the next one only planes in which GE engines were one of at least two options (Reynolds and Ordover's "engine competitive" category), the next one the two aircraft that represented the vast majority of GECAS's speculative orders-the Boeing 737 and Airbus A320-and the final regression only the engine-competitive A320.
Predictably, the various measures of customers' installed base of engines represent the most statistically and economically significant influence on market share from year to year. They have less impact in the regressions restricted to the sets of engine competitive aircraft and to A320/737, in the former case perhaps because GE installed base in that case works in two directions-companies with an installed base of GE engines may be more likely to choose GE engines on engine-competitive aircraft, but may also be more likely to switch out of the enginecompetitive category altogether and choose a GE-only model like the 737, resulting in a decrease in GE's percentage in the engine-competitive category; these two effects could cancel each other leaving little detectable net effect.
The coefficient on the wide-body percentage variable has the expected sign and is of reasonable magnitude (an increase of 1 percent in the wide-body percentage of sales yields a decrease of .5 percent in GE's market share), but is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The model availability dummies have little impact on the results, with coefficients of mixed signs and very low levels of statistical significance.
The coefficient on the GECAS dummy variable is not statistically significant in any of the regressions, is usually negative rather than positive, and in any case is small in magnitude. Only in the A320 regression is it even positive, and in that case it is both statistically insignificant and small in magnitude-indicating an increase in GE's market share of 12 percentage points in GECAS years for the A320 plane only, compared to a 27 percentage-point shift among all engine competitive planes found by Reynolds and Ordover. Table 6 shows the results of estimating a series of simple logit models on the set of all first engine choices on engine-competitive models from 1988-2002. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the airline selected GE engines on an engine-competitive plane for which it has no current installed base, and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are similar in flavor to those of the OLS regressions above, but differ on some details due to the different formulation of the data. Table 6 contains model dummies, to control for the average popularity of the different brands of engines on each platform. They also contain variables that control for the installed base of the purchasers, analogous to similar variables in the OLS regressions, though in this case installed base is calculated separately for each purchaser. Installed base is calculated in two ways: as the overall GE percentage of installed engines for that purchaser, and the GE percentage of installed engines on "near" plane types (wide-bodies if the plane in question is a wide-body, narrow-bodies if the plane in question is a narrow-body). Purchasers with no installed base in a particular category are assigned a value of zero for these variables, and are distinguished from purchasers with an non-zero installed base but zero GE engines by the use of a dummy variable ("new purchaser" or "new near" in Table 6 ).
Logit Formulations
Each of the three variations in
Since GECAS's customers for its speculative purchases tend to be smaller airlines, a series of variables controls for the size of the airline and, in the first instance, interacts with the GECAS term to determine an airline size-specific GECAS effect. For this purpose, a "small" airline is defined as an airline with an installed base of fewer than 50 engines, This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.
a "medium" airline as an airline with an installed base of 50-99 engines, and a "large" airline one with an installed base of 100 or more engines.
GECAS influence is determined in a second variation by interacting it with particular model dummies on which GECAS is active, to capture a model-specific GECAS effect. In a third variation, the GECAS dummy enters alone as it did in the OLS regressions.
In all instances, the measured GECAS effect is positive and in several cases it is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The size of the effect is largest and its statistical significance strongest in the first variation, which interacts the GECAS term with dummies representing the size of the airline. In this case, the GECAS effect is positive and statistically significant for small airlines only, and close to zero and statistically insignificant for each of the other size classes.
The coefficient on the small-GECAS interaction term translates to a 19-percentage-point greater chance that a small airline will choose GE engines on its engine-competitive aircraft in the post-GECAS period compared to the pre-GECAS period. 61 Assuming that these initial purchases defined all subsequent purchases on a given airline/platform combination, and summing across the Reynolds-Ordover post-GECAS period of 1996-2002, yields a total of 175 engines switching to GE as a result of GECAS influence. This comprises a little less than 1.5 percent of the total of 13,248 large commercial aircraft engines sold during this period.
In the end, estimating a logit model that analyzes first engine choices on engine-competitive aircraft yields the conclusion that, corresponding with the arrival of GECAS as a significant speculative lessor, small airlines were somewhat more likely to choose GE engines when making their first choice of engines on an engine-competitive platform. The total size of this effect is small, however, representing at most only about 1.5 percent of all engines sold on large commercial aircraft during this period.
